Exemptions by Nadler, Myron J.
EXEMPTIONS
MYoN J. NADLER*
Recovery of a money judgment signifies the end of one important
procedure and the beginning of another. It is the final determination of
the merits of the plaintiff's claim, and, at the same time, his authorization
to begin the enforcement or collection process. This process has, as its
ultimate objective, an appropriation of so much of the debtor's property
as may be required to satisfy the judgment against him. At common law,
there were no limitations upon creditors in the exercise of the enforce-
ment process, and all of a debtor's wealth that was amenable to legal or
equitable process could be taken in satisfaction of his just debts.' Today
however, by virtue of the exemption statutes, certain property belonging
to a debtor may be immune from the claims of creditors. These statutes
confer upon a debtor the right to hold property of a particular class and
to a certain value free from seizure and sale under legal or equitable
process for the payment of his debts. From the creditor's standpoint, the
exemption laws are of great importance to the extent that they affect
the debtor's collectibility, and thus the ultimate value of any money
judgment recovered, against him. Before commencing any extended or
expensive litigation, the prudent creditor will therefore determine what
non-exempt property of the debtor's may be available for payment of
his judgment when it is rendered. While the importance of the exemption
statutes to the debtor is obvious, it is necessary that he too have some
understanding of the nature of the rights granted him, since these may
be irretrievably lost if not seasonably and properly exercised.
Since exemptions exist solely by virtue of legislative enactment, the
appropriate statutes must be examined to determine their effect upon the
enforcement process. The principal exemptions of property from exe-
cution, attachment and other process in Ohio are found in OHIO REV.
CODE, §§2329.62 through 2329.83. These relate to the exemption of
specific chattel property, the homestead exemption, and the exemption in
lieu of homestead. In addition to these three general exemptions, there
are many specific types of property which are exempted from creditor's
claims by special statutory provisions. Included in this category are
policies of life insurance,2 police,3 and firemen's pensions,4 workmen's
compensation awards,5 and many others. Because of the limited appli-
cation of most of these special provisions, only the exemptions relating
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to insurance will be included in the following discussion. With this
exception, the scope of the present article will be confined to the three
general types of exemption.
I. PRINCILES COMMON TO ALL EXEMPTIONS
The exemption statutes are based upon a well established and en-
lightened public policy which seeks to protect the family of a debtor
against the deprivation of a home and of those household facilities which
make the family relation possible.6 This protection has been extended
also to the instrumentalities by means of which the debtor earns his
living so that he may be able to provide the necessities of life for himself
and his dependents.7 Indirectly, the benefits of the exemption statutes
accrue to the public as well which might otherwise be burdened by the
support of the destitute family. While designed for the protection of the
improvident debtor, the exemption laws do not relieve a person of the
legal responsibility for the payment of his just debts. The right to an
exemption is not a defense to an action for recovery of money, but
rather is in the nature of a stay of the proceedings to collect a claim out of
particular property. It has been characterized as a personal privilege which
must be exercised affirmatively to be enjoyed.8 Being a personal privilege,
it cannot be transferred or assigned by the debtor.'
Ordinarily, the exemption statutes would receive a strict construction
since they are in derogation of the common law."° However, in order
to effectuate the humane and beneficent purposes for which they are
enacted, it is uniformly accepted that such statutes should be liberally
construed in favor of the debtor." As a corollary, a statutory provision in
the nature of an exception to the general law of exemptions should be
given a strict interpretation." In accordance with this rule of construction,
all reasonable doubts as to the applicability of the statute to a particular
situation should be resolved so as to promote its purpose. However, the
liberal interpretation of exemption statutes should, in every case, be con-
sistent with the usual rules of statutory construction. It should not be
the basis for conferring benefits and privileges not contemplated by the
legislature by expanding the classes of property or the groups of persons
coming within the purview of the statute.
Exemption statutes are generally considered to be remedial and
thus part of the procedural rather than the substantive law of a state.
13
6 Williams v. Donough, 65 Ohio, St. 499, 63 N.E. 84 (1902) ; Dennis v. Smith,
125 Ohio St. 120, 180 N.E. 638 (1932).
7 Cleveland Arcade Co. v. Talcott, 22 Ohio App. 516, 154 N.E. 62 (1926).
8 Conley v. Chilcote, 25 Ohio St. 320 (1874).
9 Ibid.
1ODombrofsky v. Savinsky, 16 Ohio L. Abi. 114 (1933).
11 Dennis v. Smith, 125 Ohio St. 120, 180 N.E. 638 (1932); Ezra v. Sutton,
16 Ohio L. Abs 669 (1934); Klelnman v. Brown, 30 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 69 (1932);
Janasik v. Thomas, 28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 616 (1927).
1 2 Troutman v. Eichar, 64 Ohio App. 415, 28 N.E. 2d 953 (1940).
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For this reason, they are rarely enforced outside the jurisdiction of the
state which enacts them. Accordingly, in determining questions of ex-
emptions between non-residents in an attachment action brought in Ohio,
an Ohio court properly applied Ohio law.1 4 However, where money
due under a contract between residents of Michigan was exempt by
Michigan law, an Ohio court of appeals applied the exemption laws of
the foreign state in denying recovery in a garnishment action brought by
a judgment creditor of one of the contracting parties. 5 The court held
that the contract having been made in Michigan to be performed there
should be interpreted in accordance with the statutes of that state which,
in this case, applied as part of its substantive law.
It is generally understood that the right to exemptions under the
Ohio statute is limited to individual debtors. Thus, a partnership cannot
claim exemptions in any of the property belonging to the firm."6 The
individual debtor, however, may assert his exemption rights in any court
in Ohio, including justice, of the peace and mayor's courts, and in any
type of proceeding pending before any officer whereby the debtor's
property is to be seized or applied in payment of his debts.'
The principles considered thus far apply with equal importance to
all of the general exemptions from execution and attachment. With
this common background in mind, let us examine the particular application
of each of the exemption provisions.
II. ExEMPTIONS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
A. Persons Entitled to Exemptions of Personal Property
1. Single persons. Omo REV. CODE §2329.62 (11721) provides
certain limited exemptions of personal property to unmarried persons.
The legislature, having regard for the needs of those who must support
only themselves, has confined the exemption to a limited amount of the
debtor's wearing apparel, personal earnings and tools of trade. The
privilege is further restricted by the statute to residents of Ohio.
2. Persons supporting others. More liberal exemptions are granted
by OHIO REV. CODE §2329.66 (11725) to persons who have the re-
sponsiility of supporting others in addition to themselves. The benefits
of this provision are extended to (a) those who are the chief support of
a family, (b) persons paying alimony, maintenance, or other allowance
for the support of a divorced or separated spouse or for the support of a
minor child, (c) persons who are the chief support of any dependent
person, (d) and to widows. This provision is considerably more extensive
in scope than the former statute which required that a debtor be the
head and sole support of a family and reside with them in order to
14Jacoby Bros. v. Dotson, S Ohio N.P. 282 (1907).
15 Fulton v. Heinrich, 48 Ohio App. 455 (1934).
16 Aultman, et al. v. Wilson, 55 Ohio St. 138 (1896).
17 OHi Rv. CODE §2329.69 (11728). See also OHIO REV. CODE §1313.17
(11111), which preserves exemptions in Assignments for Benefit of Creditors.
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qualify for the exemption benefits. The present enactment is more
realistic in its application and is properly keyed to the responsibility of the
debtor to contribute to the support of other persons. While there is no
statutory directive to this effect, it is clear that only those who are re-
quired by law to support such other persons come within the protected
class of the statute.' s Thus, a debtor contributing to the support of a
person who is not legally dependent upon him would not be entitled to
the exemption. Consistent with the policy of providing more liberal
treatment to debtors within this group, this exemption is not limited to
residents of Ohio as is the exemption granted to unmarried debtors.
A separate statutory provision gives to married women the benefits
of all exemptions allowed to the "head of a family."' 9 Although OHIO
REV. CODE §2329.66 (11725) no longer speaks in terms of head of a
family, there is no question that the property exempt under this section
is also exempt to married women.
This is the extent to which the statute attempts to define the classes
of persons who may avail themselves of the exemptions of specific per-
sonal property. Further classifications may be developed, however, by
the types of property designated by the statute as exempt.
B. Personal Property Exempt
1. Wearing Apparel and Household Furnishings. Only the property
specifically described in the statute is exempt from execution, attachment,
and sale. If a particular chattel does not come within one of the enumer-
ated classes of property, it cannot otherwise achieve this protected status.
Most of the property to which the exemption refers is that which is
personal to the debtor and not readily salable.
The wearing apparel of all judgment debtors is exempt from seizure
under the statute."0 There is no limit upon the value of the clothing
which can be claimed by those who are the chief support of a family,
but unmarried debtors may hold such property exempt only to a value
of $100. To be exempt, the property must constitute wearing apparel
within the usual and ordinary meaning of the term.2 ' Undoubtedly, it
would include clothing and dress of all kinds actually used by the debtor
for his comfort and convenience. To what extent the term includes
ornamental jewelry is not so clear. From the-.Sases, however, it seems
likely that jewelry habitually worn or used by a debtor, such as a watch,
will be exempt as long as its value does not outweigh the purpose for
which it is worn or used.22
Household furnishings not exceeding $150 in value may also be
18 Re Hess, 21 Ohio Op. 110 .(1941).
19 O -Io REV. CODE §2323.09 (11591).
20 OmIo REV. CODE §§2329.62 (A) (11721) and 2329.66 (A) (11725).
21 18 0. JuR., ExEMPrIoNs 846.
22 Beckett v. Wisbon, 5 Ohio N.P. 155 (1907) ; Re Henry, 14 Ohio F.D. 353
(1905).
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selected as exempt by debtors who are the chief support of a family.23
This privilege, however, is not extended to unmarried debtors. Applying
the accepted standard of liberal construction to this provision indicates
that the term "household furnishings", as used in the statute, should in-
clude all objects in the home intended or used for the comfort or con-
venience of the family.24 However, the property included in this category
must bear some relation to the object of the exemption laws which is to
provide the necessities of life to the debtor and his family.
Certain other kinds of property actually designed and provided for
the use of the debtor or his family may be held exempt by those who are
the chief support of a family. These are described by the statute, and
include the beds and bedding, cooking stove, heating stove, and enough
fuel for 60 days, belonging to the debtor or his family and intended for
use by them. 25 Provisions,'including groceries, provided for the use of the
debtor or his family to a value of $50, all family books and pictures, and
all articles, specimens, and cabinets of natural history or science which
are not kept for exhibition or pecuniary gain are also included within
the exempt group of property 26
2. Tools and Implements of Trade. The tools and implements
of a debtor for carrying on his profession, trade or business, including
agriculture, and not exceeding $200 in value, may be claimed exempt
both by unmarried debtors and those who are the chief support of a
family.2 Oddly enough, the exemption allowed the latter group is
limited to necessary tools and implements, while this restriction is not
found in the statutory language granting the exemption. to unmarried
debtors. In view of the avowed policy of the legislature to deal more
liberally with those persons who have greater obligations of support, there
would seem to be no logical reason for this distinction. It has been held
under the more restricted provision that a lawyer's library is a necessary
tool or implement for the conduct of his profession.28
The question of whether an automobile may be exempt as a neces-
sary tool or implement of trade has not been so easily resolved. It has
been held that because the identity of an automobile as exempt property
would vary in each case with the circumstances of its use, this form of
property, although used exclusively by a debtor in his profession, cannot
be regarded as an essential for the carrying on of a business, trade or
profession.29 This reasoning has been rejected in later cases which have
ruled that an automobile may constitute an implement necessary for
cafIrying on a debtor's trade or business, and if it qualifies as such will be
2 3 OHIo REV. CODE §2329.66 (B) (11725).
24 18 0. Jup, EXEMPTIONS 847.
25 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.66 (A) (11725).
2 6 OHio REV. CODE §2329.66 (D), (C) and (G) (11725).
27 OHIO REV. CODE §§2329.62 (B) (11721) and 2329.66 (E) (11725).
28 Cleveland Arcade Co. v. Talcott, 22 Ohio App. 516, 154 N.E. 62 (1926).
29 Gordon v. Brewer, 32 Ohio App. 199, 166 N.E. 915 (1929).
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set off as exempt property under this provision."0 Because of the limitation
as to value, this exemption, as it applies to automobiles, is of little im-
portance in today's economy.
3. Personal Earnings. The protection of the exemption statutes
extends to a portion of the personal earnings of a debtor, but only for
services rendered by him within thirty days before the issuing of an attach-
ment or other process, the rendition of a judgment, or the making of an
order seeking to subject such earnings to the payment of a debt or other
obligation. Unmarried debtors may retain up to $30 of such earnings
free of the demands of creditors.3 " Those who are the chief support of
a family, or who otherwise qualify under that provision, are entitled for
their exemptions to 80% of the first $200 and 60% of the balance of
such earnings, but in no event less than $60.2 The limitation as to the
percentage of personal earnings which may be taken by proceedings in
aid of execution within a thirty day period means that only one creditor
can attach the non-exempt portion of the debtor's earnings during each
thirty day period."3 This prevents the taking by creditors of more than
the amount allowed by statute.
The exemption of earnings applies unconditionally and uniformly
to all types of claims. Preference is no longer given, as it was under
earlier statutes, to claims for work and labor or for necessaries purchased
by the debtor. Furthermore, the privilege is not limited to wages for
manual labor, but applies to compensation for personal services of any
kind. Accordingly, earnings due a county commissioner for his services
come within the purview of the exemption.3 4 But money due a sub-
contractor under a construction contract is not exempt even though labor
and materials are expended in the performance of the work, since the
services are rendered in this connection as an independent contractor
rather than as one working for wages.25
4. Insurance. All policies of insurance and endowment or annuity
contracts on the life of a debtor taken out for the -benefit of or made
payable, by change of beneficiary, transfer, or assignment, to his wife,
children, dependent relative, creditor, or to a trustee for the benefit of
any of them, are exempt from the claims of the insured's creditors.30
The proceeds of such policies or contracts, which include their cash sur-
render value, interest, and accumulated dividends, are also exempt under
this provision, but only until the death of the insured."7 When the policy
30 Mick v. Coey, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 646 (1936); Janasik v. Thomas, 28 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 616 (1927).
81 OmO Rav. CODE §2329.62 (C) (11721).
320io REV. CODE §2329.66 (F) (11725).
33 Kleinman v. Brown, 30 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 69 (1932).
34 Fitzgibbon v. DeChant, 58 Ohio App. 453 (1938).
35 Garretson Lumber Co. v. Ziemke, 11 Ohio L. Abs. 273 (1931).
36OHmo REv. CODE §3911.10 (9394).
37 Doethlaff v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 117 F. 2d 582 (1941).
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matures and the proceeds are paid to the beneficiary, this protection
ceases, and the funds are no longer exempt under this provision as
insurance or proceeds.
Insurance policies and proceeds are exempt only as long as the
beneficiary is one of the class named in the statute.3" The insured may
retain the right to change the beneficiary, however, without affecting the
right to the exemption. 9 If this power is exercised and the beneficiary
changed to a person not within the protected class, or if the relationship
between the insured and the beneficiary should change, the policy loses
its exempt quality.4" Whether a policy is exempt depends upon its status
at the time of seizure and not at the time the policy was issued.41 Thus,
when an exempt policy is surrendered to an insurance company as part of
the settlement of a disputed claim, the settlement proceeds in the hands
of the insurer are no longer exempt.'
The statute provides, however, that creditors may recover from the
proceeds of such insurance policies or endowment or annuity contracts
the premiums paid by the insured in fraud of creditors. 8 Fraud, as used
in this connection, has been construed to include constructive fraud, and
was inferred where an insolvent debtor diverted his assets to the payment
of insurance premiums, although no actual intent to defraud creditors was
shown.44 The right of creditors to recover out of insurance proceeds the
premiums so paid is postponed until the maturity of the policy. This
deferment does not prevent the statute of limitation from running against
the creditor's claim, and the claim must still be enforceable at the time
the policy matures. Furthermore, the action to recover the premiums
must be brought within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations
relating to fraud.
The proceeds of an insurance policy taken out by a wife on her
husband's life are also exempt from the claims of the husband's repre-
sentatives or creditors.4 5 The same preferred status is accorded policies of
insurance upon the life of any person which have been assigned to or
made payable to a married woman, whether such transfer is made by
her husband or 'by another person.46 The statute also provides that the
proceeds of any life insurance policy, or endowment or annuity contract
may be exempt from the claims of the beneficiaries' creditors as well,
if the policy or contract so provides. 47
38 Baxter v. Old National-City Bank, 46 Ohio App. 533, 189 N.E. 514 (1933).
39 Ibid.
40 Hoffman v. Weiland, 64 Ohio App. 467, 29 N.E. 2d 33 (1940).
41 Re Hess, 21, Ohio Op. 110 (1941).
42 Baxter v. Old National-City Bank, 46 Ohio App. 533, 189 N.E. 514 (1933).
4 3 OHiO Rav. CODE §3911.10 (9394).
4 4 John Weenick & Sons v. Blahd, 73 Ohio App. 67, 54 N.E. 2d 426 (1943);
cf. Doethlaff v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 117 F. 2d S82 (1941).
45 Oaio Ray. CobE §3911.11 (9397).
46 Omo Ray. CODE §3911.12 (9398).
47 OHio Rav. CODE §3911.14 (9398-1).
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A beneficiary fund, not exceeding $5000, set apart, appropriated,
or paid by a benevolent association or society to the family of a deceased
member is not liable for the payment of any of the debts of the de-
ceased.4" The proceeds of a fire insurance policy covering exempt property
is also exempt, as the funds stand in the place of the exempt property. 9
C. Claims Not Subject to Exemptions of Personal Property
A separate statutory provision excludes certain types of claims from
the effect of the homestead exemption and exemption in lieu of home-
stead, but not from the exemptions of specific personal property.50 There
is a further exception set out in the statute relating to the exemption in
lieu of homestead which provides that no personal property shall be
exempt from execution on a judgment rendered for the purchase price
or a part thereof.5 1 This limitation has been held to apply also to the
personal property exempt under OHIO REV. CODE §§2329.62 (11721)
and 2329.66 (11725). Thus, a cook stove, ordinarily exempt under the
latter section, cannot be held by a debtor free from a judgment recovered
against him for its purchase price.
52
The fact that personal property is exempt does not prevent its en-
cumbrance; 'but giving a lien on such property operates as a waiver of
the right to claim it as exempt 8  Thus, exempt household furnishings
which have -been mortgaged cannot be held exempt in an action to
enforce the mortgage by foreclosure.5 The statute dealing with me-
chanic's liens contains a provision expressly prohibiting exemptions in
property subject to such liens."-Exemptions may not be claimed against
a judgment for taxes.56
The courts have had some difficulty with the question of whether a
judgment for alimony is enforceable against exempt property. The pre-
vailing view in Ohio is that exemptions can be claimed against a judg-
ment for alimony, since the statute does not expressly except such claims
from the operation of the exemption laws.57 Enforcement of a judgment
for alimony has been permitted, however, against a workmen's compen-
sation award which is exempt from claims of creditors under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, on the grounds that alimony is not a debt
within the meaning of that Act, but an obligation imposed by law
because of public policy.
58
48 OHIo RE V. CODE §2329.63 (11722).
49 Dennis v. Smith, 125 Ohio St. 120, 180 N.E. 638 (1932).
50 OHo REv. CODE §2329.72 (11729).
51 OHio REV. CODE §2329.81 (11738).
52 State v. Arnold, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 36 (1925).
53 Ohio Loan Co. v. Kletecka, 47 Ohio App. 514, 192 N.E. 182 (1934);
Ridenour v. Scott, 39 Ohio App. 529, 177 N.E. 926 (1931).
54 Ohio Loan Co. v. Kietecka, supra, note 53.
55 OHIo REV. CODE §1311.34 (8339).
56 OHIo Ray. CODE §5719.08 (5697 & 5698).
57 Sweigart v. Sweigart, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 250 (1940).
58 Chapman v. Chapman, 29 Ohio Op. 273 (1944).
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D. Establishment and Loss of Right
As previously indicated, the right to an exemption is merely a
personal privilege, and must be asserted affirmatively by the debtor. The
privilege may be exercised by making a demand for the exemptions upon
the officer serving the execution,59 or by motion directed to the court
which issued the order under which the property is being taken.60 The
demand need not be in any particular form and any language that clearly
informs the officer of the claim will suffice. Since most of the exemptions
of specific personal property depend upon their selection by the debtor,
a mere demand without notifying the officer of the particular property
claimed exempt is not sufficient. If the debtor fails to choose the property
to be exempt, the officer is authorized to proceed with its sale. 61 Both
the demand and selection must be made -before a sale of the property
under the order or process,62 or in the case of an attachment, before
the property is actually applied to the payment of the debt.63
The right to an exemption can be waived. If the debtor fails to
exercise the right by making a proper and timely demand and selection,
the exemption will be deemed to have been waived. 4 The right may
also be waived by the sale, transfer or encumbrance of the property
subject to the exemption. Although a debtor may waive the exemption
right, he may not do so by executory contract. The statute provides that
every promise, agreement or contract made or entered into whereby the
exemption laws of Ohio are sought to be waived are to that extent void."6
The purpose of this provision, which is merely a codification of earlier
case law, is to safeguard for the debtor the protection afforded by the
exemption laws. This provision is limited, however, to executory agree-
ments to waive exemptions and does not affect executed waivers.
III. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
In addition to the exemptions discussed in the preceding section, the
statute permits certain debtors to hold real estate occupied by them as a
homestead free from the claims of creditors." Unlike the exemption of
personal property in which the debtor acquires absolute ownership with
full power of disposition, the debtor acquires no protected legal title to
property set off as a homestead.6" The statute does not affect the owner-
ship of the property but merely exempts it from sale for the payment of
debts. The exemption, then, is a mere possessory right to use and occupy
G Regan v. Zeeb, 28 Ohio St. 483 (1876).
GOKirk v. Stevenson, 59 Ohio St. 556, 53 N.E. 49 (1899).
61 Rempe v. Ravens, 68 Ohio St. 113, 67 N.E. 282 (1903).
6 Butt v. Green, 29 Ohio St. 667 (1876).
63 Hoover v. Haslage, 5 Ohio N.P. 90 (1907).
64 Butt v. Green, 29 Ohio St. 667 (1876).
65 Ohio Loan Co. v. Kletecka, 47 Ohio App. 514, 192 N.E. 182 (1934).
66 OHIo REv. ConE §2329.72 (11729).
6 7 OHo REv. ConE §2329.73 (11730).
68 Genell v. Hirons, 70 Ohio St. 309, 71 N.E. 709 (1904).
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the property as a homestead. Being a possessory right, it does not con-
stitute an assignable estate, nor does it run with the land.6 9 Thus the
exemption may be lost if the debtor conveys the property to another or
ceases to occupy it as his homestead. 7°
Because the statute exempts the homestead from sale only, and
not from execution and attachment as in the case of chattel property,
judgment liens may attach to the property.7 ' Such liens are not lost
when the property is set off as a homestead, but as long as the property
retains its identity as a homestead, no sale to enforce the lien will be
permitted. When the property ceases to be used and occupied as a home-
stead, the inactive liens may then be enforced.
A. Persons Entitled to Homestead Exemption
1. A husband and wife living together are entitled to the homestead
exemption, but neither will be allowed a homestead if one has already
been demanded and set off to the other.7'2 Ownership of property by a
husband and wife as tenants in common will not be construed as though
the wife is the owner of a homestead so as to preclude her husband from
claiming the right in the property against his creditors.' Whether a
husband and wife are living together for the purposes of the exemption
depends upon the facts existing at the time the property is seized and not
when the judgment is rendered. 4 A temporary separation will not
deprive them of the exemption as long as there has not been an abandon-
ment of the homestead.
2. Every widow may claim the homestead exemption whether or
not living with dependent children, but only in her own property.7
A divorced woman is not considered a widow for the purposes of the
exemption statutes.7 ' A widow is also entitled to a homestead in the
property of her deceased husband by virtue of a special statutory provision
which grants the exemption in the event of a sale of his property 'by an
executor or administrator to pay debts.' As long as she remains un-
married and resides in the property, it is exempt from sale under exe-
cution or order of court. This special privilege is also extended to an
unmarried minor child of the decedent who remains in the property.
3. A widower living with an unmarried daughter or unmarried
minor son is also entitled to the homestead exemption. 78 The exemption
69 Morgridge v. Converse, 150 Ohio St. 239, 81 N.E. 2d 112 (1948) ; Gledhill
v. Walker, 143 Ohio St. 381, 55 N.E. 2d 647 (1944).
7OMcComb v. Thompson, 42 Ohio St. 139 (1884).
71 Ibid.
72 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.73 (11730).
73 New Martinsville Grocery Co. v. Hannibal Store Co., 65 Ohio App. 50,
29 N.E. 2d 226 (1940).
74 20 0. Jum., HOMESTEADS 983.
75 OHIo REV. CODE §2329.73 (11730).
76 Condon v. Condon, 19 Ohio Op. 549, 33 Ohio L Abs. 474 (1940).
77 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.75 (11732).
78 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.73 (11730).
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will not be allowed to a widower who places his children in an orphanage
even though he is contributing to their support, since he is not living with
them as required by the statute.79 Although earlier cases held otherwise,
it is now settled that a divorced man is not a widower for the purposes
of the exemption statutes."0 While there is no express provision in the
exemption statutes granting a homestead to a surviving husband in the
lands of his deceased wife, the exemption has been allowed on the basis
of a probate code section which provides for a homestead exemption to
every surviving spouse."1 Since this provision, which antedates the exemp-
tion statutes, does not restrict the exemption to widows alone, the privilege
has been extended by the courts to widowers as well."2
Although the statute names only three groups of persons that are
entitled to the homestead exemption, the right has been extended in a
late case to every debtor with a family. 3 This decision is based on the
wording of OHIo REV. CODIE §2329.77 (11734) which describes the
manner for setting off a homestead, and which provides that a homestead
shall be granted on application of the debtor "if such debtor has a
family." This tenuous construction of the statute indicates the extent
to which some courts are prepared to go in extending the benefits of the
exemption laws in a hardship case.
B. Property Constituting a Homestead
A homestead, as contemplated by the statute, is the real property in
which the debtor and his family reside with the intention of making it
their permanent residence."4 A temporary or involuntary absence from
the premises will not defeat the homestead as long as the family-intends
to return and has not established a permanent home elsewhere. To claim
a homestead, the debtor must also own some interest in the property.85
It is not essential that he hold title in fee simple; almost any lesser in-
terest, including an equitable title, will suffice.8 6 A homestead may also
be granted in property occupied under lease, but need not be claimed to
the exclusion of the exemption in lieu of homestead if the lease is for
a short term.
87
The statute provides that the homestead shall be set off to the
debtor by metes and bounds out of the lands about to be levied upon and
79 Ezra v. Sutton, 16 Ohio L Abs. 669 (1934).
80 Condon v. Condon, 19 Ohio Op. 549, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 474 (1940); Bentz
v. Bentz, 24 Ohio Op. 99, 8 Ohio Supp. 125 (1941).
8 1 OHrO REv. CODE §2127.26 (10510-30).
82 Re Barnhiser, 25 Ohio Op. 388 (1943); cf. Geese v. Murphy, 8 Ohio Op.
32, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 189 (1937).
83 Re Zerkle, 68 Ohio App. 480, 42 N.E. 2d 204 (1941).
84 Mutual Bldg. & Invest Co. v. Efros, 152 Ohio St. 369, 89 N.E. 2d 648
(1949).
85 Re Talbott, 14 Ohio F.D. 465 (1904).
86 Radford v. Kachman, 27 Ohio App. 86, 160 N.E. 875 (1927).
87 Colwell v. Carper, 15 Ohio St. 279 (1864).
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shall not exceed $1000 in value. 8 The remainder of the debtor's property
is then amenable to sale on execution, although no further enforcement
proceedings can be undertaken against the homestead as long as it is
occupied as such. If the homestead consists of a house and lot which in
the opinion of the appraisers will not bear division without manifest in-
jury and inconvenience, a substitute arrangement is provided by the
statute.8" In such event, the creditor is entitled to receive the reasonable
annual rental value of the homestead exceeding $100 until his claim is
paid in full. The debtor may remain in the property as long as he makes
the payments, but in the event of a default the officer must sell the land
and apply the proceeds to the payment of the debt.
C. Claims Not Subject to Homestead Exemption
1. There are five types of claims which by statute are made superior
to the homestead exemption and exemption in lieu of homestead. A judg-
ment rendered on a mortgage executed by the debtor and his wife is one
of this group and takes precedence over the debtor's right to a home-
stead."0 It is not the policy of the exemption statutes to allow a debtor
to hold property against liens which he himself has created. But the
debtor's wife or family are not precluded from claiming a homestead in
mortgaged property unless the wife has joined in the mortgage."' This
limitation confers no new right upon the wife, but is merely intended
to protect the family against the debtor's own weaknesses. So, if the
mortgage is given by the husband alone before the right to a homestead
attached to the property, the enforcement of the mortgage is not affected
by the wife's failure to join in its execution. 92
2. Claims of less than $100 for manual work or labor are superior
to the debtor's homestead exemption. 93 The limitation of $100 deter-
mines the nature of the claim coming within this exception, and does not
merely refer to the maximum amount for which such claims may be
enforced against the homestead. Thus a claim of this type in excess of
$100 does not fall within this group and cannot be asserted against the
exemption for the amount allowed by the statute. 4
3. The lien by mortgage or otherwise of the vendor for the pur-
chase money of the property is not impaired by the right of the purchaser
to claim a homestead in the premises.95
4. Liens granted mechanics and other persons by virtue of statute
for materials furnished or labor performed in the erection of a dwelling-
88 OHIO REv. CODE §2329.77 (11734).
89 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.78 (11735).
90 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.72 (11729).
91 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.82 (11739).
92 Gibson v. Mundell, 29 Ohio St. 523 (1876).
93 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.72 (11729).
94 20 0. JuR., HOMESTEADS 999.
95 OHIO REv. CODE §2329.72 (11729).
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house on the homestead premises can be asserted free of the debtor's
claim for a homestead. 96
5. The homestead exemption may not be claimed against an
obligation for taxes owing upon the homestead property.
9 7
When a homestead is charged with liens some of which preclude
the allowance of the homestead exemption, the statute provides that upon
a sale of the property, the proceeds shall be applied first in payment of the
liens superior to the exemption. 8 Out of the funds remaining, the next
$500 is paid to the debtor in lieu of his homestead exemption, and the
balance, if any, to the unpreferred liens on the property. This provision
is applicable even though the proceedings to sell the property are initiated
to enforce a lien against which the homestead can be claimed. 9 The
same procedure is authorized by the statute where the property of a
decedent is sold by an administrator or executor to pay liens which are
preferred by the statute.100 After satisfaction of the liens, the decedent's
widow or unmarried minor child receives $500 from the proceeds of the
sale in lieu of the homestead exemption they would otherwise have been
entitled to.
D. Establishment and Loss of Right
The homestead exemption is not an absolute right, and must be
demanded by the debtor before it will be set off to him under the statute.
The exemption may be claimed at any time before the property is sold
by making a demand upon the officer levying the writ of execution or
by application to the court issuing the process under which the property
is to be seized. The husband, or his agent or attorney, is the proper
person to make the demand, but the wife may act in the event of his
failure or refusal to claim the exemption.
10
'
If either the debtor or his wife fails to demand the homestead in
the proper manner and within the allowed time, the right will be con-
sidered waived.' The exemption may also be lost if the debtor and his
family cease to occupy the premises as their home. Abandonment of the
homestead by the husband, however, will not affect the right of the wife
and family to the exemption as long as they continue to reside in the
property. But since the domicile of the family follows that of its head,
the homestead will be lost if the debtor acquires a new residence which
he intends to be the permanent family home. However, as with all
exemptions, any executory promise, contract or agreement by which the
96 Ibid.
07 Cowen v. Wassman, 64 Ohio App. 84 (1939).
O8 OHO REv. CODE §2329.80 (11737).
99 Aiken Loan Co. v. Mustaine, 63 Ohio App. 227 (1939).
100 OHIO REv. CODE §2329.76 (11733).
101 OHIo REv. CODE §2329.77 (11734).
1
0 2 McComb v. Thompson, 42 Ohio St. 139 (1884).
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debtor attempts to waive the benefits of the homestead exemption is to
that extent absolutely void under the statute. 0 3
IV. EXEMPTIONS IN LiEu OF HOMESTEAD
This third distinct type of exemption is available to certain debtors
who are not the owners of a homestead, and is intended as a substitute
for the benefits which accrue to the family through occupancy of the
family dwelling.1°  The exemption applies to any real or personal property
of the debtor selected by him to a value of $500, and is in addition to
the other exempt property to which he may be entitled under the exemp-
tion statutes. Once the property has been selected and set off to the
debtor, he acquires absolute ownership in it with full power of dis-
position.1"5 In this respect, the exemption of real property under this
provision differs from the homestead exemption.
This exemption should not he confused with the alternative pro-
visions under the homestead statute which provide for the payment to
the debtor from the proceeds of the sale of a homestead when the
property is subject to liens which prevent it from being set off in the
usual manner. These provisions presuppose the debtor to be the owner of
a homestead, and thus not eligible for the benefits of this exemption.
Only when the proceeds from the sale of a homestead charged with liens
is insufficient to allow the debtor the full $500, is he permitted to claim
the balance under the exemption in lieu of homestead. 0 6
Whether a debtor is the owner of a homestead in order to qualify
for this exemption is determined by the factors discussed in the preceding
section as they exist at the time the property is actually seized under an
execution or order of sale.'0 6' The status of the debtor as one of the
class entitled to this exemption is also determined as of the same time.107
A. Persons Entitled to the Exemption in Lieu of Homestead
1. Husband and wife living together may claim the exemption in
lieu of homestead if they are not the owners of -a homestead.' 08 The
principles adoped by the courts in determining whether a husband and
wife are entitled to the homestead exemption are, of course, applicable
here. As with the homestead exemption, the wife is permitted to claim
the exemption in lieu of homestead if the husband neglects or refuses to
do so. The statutory provision granting to married women all the
exemptions allowed the head of a family has been construed to include
the exemption in lieu of homestead as well.1 09 This privilege applies,
103 OHio REv. CODE §2329.72 (11729).
1 0 4 Omo REv. CODE §2329.81 (11738).
105 Gledhill v. Walker, 143 Ohio St. 381, 55 N.E. 2d 647 (1944).
1o 20 0. Jua., HOMEnEADS 1057.
1 0
oaRodler v. Trovillo, 11 Ohio Op. 512, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 556 (1938).
107 Sweigart v. Sweigart, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 250, 35 N.E. 2d 578 (1940).
108 OHIo REv. CODE §2329.81 (11738).
109 Home Banking Co. v. Huffman, 1 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 349 (1903).
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however, only to the property owned by a married woman in her own
right, and does not enlarge her exemption rights in her husband's property.
2. A widow who is not the owner of a homestead is entitled to
this exemption."' This right extends only to the separate property of
the widow, and does not permit her to hold exempt any of the property
owned by her husband during his lifetime, nor to claim the exemption
against judgments asserted against his estate."11 The cases dealing with
those who are considered widows for the purposes of the exemption laws
have been discussed in connection with the homestead exemption.
3. A widower living with an unmarried daughter or unmarried
minor son, and not the owner of a homestead, is eligible for the exemp-
tion in lieu of homestead." This classification of persons has been
treated in the preceding section.
4. Every unmarried female having in good faith the care, mainte-
nance and custody of a minor child of a deceased relative, who is a
resident of this state and not the owner of a homestead, is entitled to the
exemption in lieu thereof."' Except for this additional class of persons,
the exemption in lieu of homestead is granted to the same persons who
would be entitled to the homestead exemption if the owners of a
dwelling. Although the benefits of this exemption were extended in an
early case to a divorced woman having the care and custody of her minor
children," 4 this holding has -been abrogated in a more recent decision in
which the court held that under such circumstances the children being
cared for are not those of a deceased relative as required by statute, and
that meaning must be ascribed to every phrase of the exemption statute. 115
B. Property Exempt in Lieu of Homestead
The statute provides that a debtor may hold exempt in lieu of
homestead real or personal property to be selected by him not exceeding
$500 in value. 116 As indicated earlier, the property exempted under this
provision is in addition to the personal property to which the debtor may
be entitled under OHIO REv. CoDE §2329.66 (11725). Any of the
debtor's property may be claimed under this exemption other than money,
salary or wages due to him from any person, partnership or corporation,
and passenger automobiles, which are specifically excepted by the
statute."' Cash in the possession of the debtor, however, can be claimed
exempt.
The restriction against selecting money, salary or wagqs is not
limited to the debtor's personal earnings for labor or services performed,
1 10 OHio Rav. CODE §2329.81 (11738).
rn Dillnan v. Warner, 54 Ohio App. 170 (1935).
112OHO REV. CODE §2329.81 (11738).
113 Ibid.
114 Re Giles, 6 Ohio L R. 173 (1908).
115 Condon v. Condon, 19 Ohio Op. 549, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 474 (1940).
'16 OHIO REY. CODE §2329.81 (11738).
117 Ibid.
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but includes funds due him from every source.11 Thus, money on deposit
in a bank is not exempt for the relation of debtor and creditor exists be-
tween the bank and the depositor.11 9 But this reasoning is not applied
except where the relation of debtor and creditor has been created by
voluntary contract. When property which might have been claimed
exempt has been destroyed by fire, the insurance proceeds due the debtor
for the loss may be selected as exempt in lieu of homestead. 2
Much of the litigation arising in connection with this exemption
deals with the interpretation of the terms "person" and "corporation"
from whom money due may not be selected as exempt. It is now well
settled that "person" includes an administrator or executor, and that
money in the hands of such fiduciary ready for payment to a legatee
pursuant to ar order of distribution is not exempt. 121 Before an order
of distribution is made, however, the funds are exempt since they are in
custodia legis and the fiduciary holds them as an officer of the court
rather than as a "person" under the statute. 2 A sovereign government
is not a "corporation" for the purposes of the statute, and obligations of
the United States in the nature of bonds are not money due from a
corporation and may be selected under the exemption.12 Similarly, a
dividend check issued to a debtor under his National Service Life In-
surance may also be exempt."2
The statute also prohibits the selection of a passenger automobile
as exempt property in lieu of homestead.' 25 The term does not refer to
the physical attributes of the vehicle but to the uses to which it is devoted.
If used by the debtor principally in the conduct of his business and if
essential for that purpose, its identity as a passenger automobile will not
prevent the exemption. A passenger automobile required by a travelling
salesman for the performance of his work has been set off as exempt
property under this provision. 1 26
The statute contemplates that the exemption shall be allowed out
of specific items of property. An arrangement to .pay the debtor the
sum of $500 in cash from the proceeds of the sale of property which has
been seized and which might be claimed exempt may not be equitable to
creditors since the property may sell for less than its appraised value. If
118 Morris Plan Bank v. Viona, 122 Ohio St. 28, 170 N. E. 650 (1930).
119 Ibid.
120 Dennis v. Smith, 125 Ohio St. 120, 180 N.E. 638 (1932).
121 City Loan & Svgs. v. Guthridge, 61 Ohio App. 202 (1938); Caton v.
Kohler, 69 Ohio App. 455 (1941).
122 Orlopp v. Schueller, 72 Ohio St. 41 (1905).
123 Troutman v. Eichar, 64 Ohio App. 415, 28 N.E. 2d 953 (1940).
124 Re Walker, 43 Ohio Op. 379 (1950).
125 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.81 (11738).
126 Matter of Antle, 11 Am. Bank. Rep. (N.S.) 127 (1927). But a passenger
automobile of an optometrist not essential in the conduct of his business was held
not exempt in Re Temple, 20 F. Supp. 593 (1936).
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the debtor requests that all the property levied upon be sold, he should
bear a fair share of the cost of the sale, and absorb a proportionate share
of the loss if the property brings less than the amount for which it was
appraised.127
C. Claims Not Subject to Exemption in Lieu of Homestead
The five specific classes of claims enumerated by the statute against
the enforcement of which a debtor may not claim the homestead exemp-
tion or exemption in lieu of homestead have been discussed in the pre-
ceding section. The provision granting the exemption in lieu of home-
stead, however, describes an additional type of claim against which this
exemption may not -be asserted. 2 ' It provides that no personal property
shall be selected as exempt from execution on a judgment rendered for
the purchase price or any part thereof. For the purposes of the exemption
in lieu of homestead, the unsecured vendor of personal property is given
the same privileged status as the vendor whose claims for the purchase
price of realty is secured by mortgage or other lien. But in order for an
unpaid seller to take advantage of this preferred position, his claim must
be solely for the purchase price or a part thereof. If he combines his
claim for the purchase money with a claim for merchandise sold and
delivered on open account, he waives his right under this provision of the
statute.12
9
D. Establishment and Loss of Right.
The manner in which the right to the exemption in lieu of home-
stead must be exercised and the circumstances under which its benefits
may be lost are determined generally by the same principles pertaining
to the exemptions of specific personal property which have been discussed
in connection with that subject. It will suffice here to note that once the
debtor has selected and had set off to him the property exempt in lieu of
homestead, he may, notwithstanding the first allowance, continue to
claim the exemption at any time in the future. The right may be re-
asserted against the same judgment and out of the same property, or if
that has been consumed, out of other property, subject only to the limita-
tion that the value of the property claimed -by the debtor at any one time
may not exceed the statutory allowance.'3 0
V. CONCLUSION
This general review of the Ohio exemption laws indicates the
extent of the protection afforded debtors today in the enforcement or
collection process. Unfortunately, this protection is no longer sufficiently
effective in most cases to accomplish the purposes for which the exemption
statutes were originally enacted. The inadequacy of the statutes is not in
the scope of their application, but in their restrictions upon the amount of
127 20 0. JUR., HOMESTEADS 1059.
128 OHio REv. CoDE §2329.81 (11738).
129 State ex rel. Coles v. Shook, 97 Ohio St. 164, 118 N. E. 1010 (1918).
130 Sweigart v. Sweigart, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 250, 35 N.E. 2d 578 (1940).
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property which a debtor is permitted to retain for his family. The limita-
tions of value upon many of the items exempted are neither realistic nor
practical in our present economy. This is especially true of the homestead
exemption where the maximum value of $1000 upon the land and
buildings which may be exempt has prevailed without change since 1869.
If the benevolent objects of the exemption statutes are to be fully realized,
the benefits available must be increased by the legislature. At such time,
perhaps some measure of uniformity can also be achieved in the termi-
nology of the various statutes, thus eliminating several areas of doubt
and confusion.
